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nation comes from the Centre Partys dominant position in the rural,
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1 Introduction
The monthly publication of the governments and parties popularity ratings
receives more and more attention in the media. Speculation arises on the factors
and events altering the ratings. Research on the factors changing the political
actors popularity has been part of economics and political science over three
decades. A widely acknowledged fact is that the economy to a remarkable
degree drives the government popularity. Unsurprisingly, unemployment is the
most common economic variable to explain the government popularity, other
inßuential variable being inßation and incomes. Also in the Finnish evidence
so far, unemployment has been connected at the national level to the decline of
the incumbent popularity as well as to the increase of the popularity of the left
parties.
Generally, the media report the overall, or aggregate, approval ratings. Only
lately, there has been a tendency towards a more detailed reporting. However,
any survey bears in itself almost innumerous possibilities to aggregation since in
order to fulÞll the required representativeness, the pollster has to record various
individual qualities regarding the respondent. These qualities allow the survey
result to be presented either as an aggregate Þgure or as a group-wise result
where the responses are aggregated according to the desired individual quality.
Availability of the individual-level data for research purposes has increased over
the years allowing new aspects of the political behavior to be explored.
Individual-level data caters for the possibility of appending the data with
additional variables. For example, when the respondents residential area can
be traced, then it is possible to connect the respondent to any local economic
indicators. This has been one of the latest trends in the popularity research.
Behind the increased interest lies the diverging economic development within
countries. In this matter Finland has not been an exception. In 1991-95, Finland
experienced the deepest peace-time depression ever. It created diﬀerences in the
economic conditions between individuals, socio-economic groups and provinces.
Hence, we wish to Þnd out whether these diﬀerences are visible in the group-
wise evaluations of the government. Particularly, the diverging local unemploy-
ment rates lead us to assume diverging behavior among citizens from diﬀerent
provinces. Basically, we assume that living in a province with high unemploy-
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ment lowers ones likelihood to approve of the government. As the Þrst Finnish
individual-level study, we wish to gain basic knowledge on whether diﬀerent
socio-economic and demographic qualities are linked to ones approval deci-
sion. According to several measures there seems to have happened diverging
economic development not only between groups, but within groups, too. We
explore whether there exists within these groups some subgroups which tend to
approve diﬀerently.
In theory, the incumbents have been held accountable for the economic de-
velopment in the incumbency period since the publication of The Economic
Theory of Democracy by Downs (1957). The incumbent parties are punished
(rewarded) for bad (good) economic outcomes by voting against (for) them. The
Downsian responsibility theory assumes similar policy preferences for each party.
The partisan approach (Hibbs, 1977) replaces this assumption with one that al-
lows diﬀerent economic policy preferences for the leftist and rightist parties.
The left parties are assumed to be more concerned about the unemployment,
the right parties about the inßation and growth. On the background lies the
assumption of diﬀerent preferences between the parties core voters. Assumed
direction of inßuence is derived either from the traditional class hypothesis or the
connection goes via the voters preferences on income redistribution, i.e. level
of governments share in the economy. Ones propensity to adverse economic
shocks, like unemployment, leads one to favor redistributive politics. People
likely to experience the adversaries are assumed to vote and approve similarly.
In the circumstances of the left (right) incumbent and increasing unemployment
(inßation), the voters and poll respondents have two response possibilities: 1)
to support the leftist (rightist) parties, since they are believed to be the only
able parties to tackle the unemployment (inßation) (Swank, 1993), 2) to punish
the left (right) incumbent, since it has not been able to tackle the unemploy-
ment (inßation) considered to be its top priority in the economy (salient goal
approach, Powell and Whitten, 1993 ).
Empirical testing of the incumbents responsibility started in the beginning
of the 1970s with the studies by Kramer (1971), Mueller (1970) and Goodhart
and Bhansali (1970). The basic idea in the operationalization of the respon-
sibility hypothesis is to explain the incumbents popularity rating by various
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economic indicators and political events. This relationship is called the popular-
ity function. The majority of the empirical popularity function studies applies
either the national aggregates or the individual indicators. In the latter, the
economic explanatory variables are based on the poll respondents own percep-
tions and reporting, whereas in the former, the objective economic indicators
are employed. Naturally, the subjective evaluation of ones own and the nations
economy may be biased due to the favorite partys incumbency (see e.g. Zaller,
2001).
The choice of the explanatory variables into the popularity function has
brought up interesting debates into the Þeld. The following questions have re-
ceived the most attention: What is the poll respondents economic reference
group when (s)he evaluates the incumbent, i.e. is the approval decision based
on her/his own pocketbook (egotropic approval) or does (s)he take the success of
the national economy into account (sociotropic approval)? Does (s)he judge the
incumbent by its performance so far (retrospective evaluation) or by what (s)he
expects of it (prospective evaluation)?1 The egotropic and sociotropic aspects
of approval were introduced by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979). To be able to detect
the two basis of approval from each other, one needs survey data with questions
on the respondents own economy and her/his perceptions on the national econ-
omy. However, Kramer (1983) questioned the suitability of the survey data for
distinguishing the changes in the economy in general and the changes caused by
the government. In addition, he suggested an intermediate aggregation between
the individual and the aggregate level. For along time there wasnt many to
follow his suggestion. Nowadays, there is a slightly increasing amount of studies
concentrating on the local economic conditions, regional political and social dif-
ferences and their inßuence on the political outcomes. In several studies on the
British elections, it is concluded either that the better the local economy is do-
ing, the higher the government support (Pattie and Johnston, 1995b), or more
exactly, the higher the regional unemployment, the lower the support for the
government (Pattie and Johnston, 1995a, Johnston et al., 2000). There is also
discussion whether controlling all the relevant individual qualities removes the
inter-regional variation in party or government support (Johnston and Pattie,
1For a quite recent review on the topics see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000).
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1998). In Britain, it does not seem to be so.
Not only regional but also other groupwise unemployment rates have been
linked to approval and vote choice. For example it is found that the group-
speciÞc unemployment rates do not perform better than the aggregate unem-
ployment rate, when the popularity of the Swedish Social Democratic Party
is studied (Jonung and Wadensjö, 1987). Another aspect to groupwise diﬀer-
ences in approval and voting behavior is to test whether diﬀerent groups react
diﬀerently to changes in the economy. There is empirical support for the par-
tisan divide in issues related to unemployment, real incomes and inßation in
the US (Hibbs et al. 1982a), whereas in Britain the voters sensitivity towards
unemployment and real incomes in evaluating the government follows the occu-
pational divide between blue-collars and white-collars (Hibbs et al. 1982b). On
Irish data, it is concluded that voters in lower social classes are concerned about
unemployment, whereas in higher social classes they are concerned about inter-
est rates and changes in disposable incomes (Borooah and Borooah, 1990). The
popularity of the Swedish Social Democratic Party is not aﬀected by economic
variables in the older age groups and in the lowest income group but unemploy-
ment has the biggest inßuence on party popularity in the middle-income group
(Jonung and Wadesjö, 1987).
The previous Finnish studies concentrate on the aggregate level party and
government popularites. A connection between the national unemployment and
the aggregate approval rates of the Finnish government (Mattila, 1994, Nyberg
2000) and of the parties (Nyberg, 2000, Asikainen, 2002) is a common Þnding. In
addition, both the responsibility and the partisan hypothesis are supported. The
right incumbent parties are punished for increasing unemployment, whereas the
left parties increase their support at the same time. Especially, the incumbents
of 1991-95 (the Centre Party, the National Coalition) are severely punished
for bad economic development when unemployment is used as an indicator.
(Asikainen, 2002) Finland has been included in several Scandinavian multi-
country studies, where the results are weak and inconsistent or that only the
left parties whether incumbent or not are aﬀected by the economy. (Mattila,
1996, Pacek and Radcliﬀ, 1999)
The above mentioned results - the international evidence on the regional
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and groupwise diﬀerences and the previous Finnish results - lead us to question
whether the regional divide exists in Finland and whether groups diﬀer from
each other in evaluating the government. The data used in looking for the
answers includes 15 surveys on the Finnish government popularity from 1992 to
2001. More speciÞcally, our research questions are the following.
1. Unemployment and approval. We apply local unemployment, to test
whether the local circumstances matter, when it comes to approving of
the national government. Here we rely on the responsibility hypothesis;
no matter which government coalition reigns, it is punished for the unem-
ployment. In other words, the likelihood of approving of the government is
lower in the provinces with a high unemployment rate. In addition, from
1995 to 2001, the surveys have included a question of ones own labour
market status. Our interest is to see whether the behavior among the
unemployed diﬀers crucially from others.
2. Groups and approval. All the socio-economic groups do not beneÞt
equally of the economic growth, just as not all the groups suﬀer similarly
in the recession. In Finland, we have comprehensive evidence on the diﬀer-
ences in the economic and social well-being between groups and regions in
the 1990s. But there is not yet evidence on the diﬀerences in the govern-
ment support between groups and regions. Our interest lies in exploring
whether there is a group or groups that very strongly disapproved of the
government and whether that is related to their experiences during the
crisis. Overall, we expect that those in a less-well-oﬀ position would view
the government more critically than others. To complete our hyptheses,
we apply traditional class voting hypothesis and prefences for income re-
distribution. In addition, we test our hypotheses within groups divided by
age, sex, education, income class, occupational class, residential province,
labor market status and vote intention. Naturally, we do not expect all
the groups to have signiÞcantly divergent behavior.
In the following, we Þrst present diﬀerent ways in which the regional divide
can come up and then describe the economic diﬀerences between groups in the
1990s. Our data is described in the chapter 3. Chapter 4 begins with the
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method and is followed by the results.
2 The Potential Role of the Economy
2.1 Regional Distinctiveness
In the following, we present features of the regional and groupwise economic
development that gives us a cause to assume divergent government approval
patterns both between and within regions and groups.
Generally, we agree with the well-known phrase the changes in the econ-
omy are experienced locally rather than nationally. However, the relationship
between the national and local economy in explaining the popularity ratings
should not be seen as rival, but more as complementary to each other. The
local economy may go to diﬀerent direction as the national economy. The same
applies of course to ones personal economy with respect to the national and
local economies. Yet, they do not exclude each other in outlining the countrys
economic development. Overall, the regional economic divergence has gained
attention in the economics research and, thus, the importance of connecting
a person to her/his locality has been notiÞed also in the popularity research
(see e.g. Marsh, 2002). It is admitted that controlling on the decision-making
context is essential as the contexts (be it regions or other kind of groups) dif-
fer from each other with respect to the dependent and independent variables.
Marsh (2002) also reminds of the general, but in many cases misleading, as-
sumption of the universal equivalence of phenomena, events and issues2. In
other words, we often hold comparable things that are it only on the surface.
Regions diﬀer from each other due to the disparities in the production struc-
ture, which creates diﬀerent kind of skill structures and skill-distributions to
the regions. Diﬀerences in the production structure lead to diﬀerences in the
economic development, not only in a crisis but in normal times, too. The share
of industrial manufacturing and agriculture in the employment, unemployment
rate and regional gross domestic product are structural factors that emphasize
regional distinctiveness and are further reßected for example in the regional po-
2He refers to a situation of being a small farmers in the western Ireland and being it near
the capital.
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litical athmosphere. Furthermore, the possible restructuring of the production
leads to concentration of diﬀerent sectorial employment in diﬀerent areas. This
again causes changes in the local socio-economic composition, and selective mi-
gration from a region to another still strengthens this eﬀect. (Curtice and Steed,
1982)
In the Finnish case, the usual statistical measures conÞrm the variation be-
tween regions. The length of the depression varied from region to region from 4
to 8-9 years (Kuntaliitto, 1999). As Table 1 shows, the highest unemployment
rates in the crisis years were in Eastern and Northern Finland. Those rates also
remained high as there was a regional mismatch in the job creation process:
employment opportunities increased in the Western and Southern Finland, but
unemployment increasingly concentrated on the Eastern and Northern Finland
(Koskela and Uusitalo, 2002). Convergence in the regional employment rates
began in 1997 (Kangasharju et al., 2002). Another general measure for diﬀer-
ences is incomes. When the country is divided into four areas, it seems that
from 1990 to 1998, the relative income diﬀerences between regions did not grow.
Taxation and transfers had a role in smoothing the diﬀerences. Within the re-
gions the picture is, though, diﬀerent. Gini-coeﬃcients calculated on the basis
of disposable and gross incomes per capita for each area separately show that in
the 1990s the income inequality within the regions started to increase. It began
Þrst in the capital area and then spread throughout the country. Nevertheless,
this divergence did not occur in the factor incomes. (Kangasharju et al., 2002)
It is obvious that there are many objective economic indicators to outline
the regional economic distinctiveness. We have chosen the local unemployment.
There are several reasons that speak for the use of the local unemployment
as the local economic indicator. First, there is a lot of variation in the local
unemployment rates (see Table 1.). Nevertheless, the diverging unemployment
development is not fully mediated to disposable income diﬀerences since the so-
cial transfers had high coverage percentage (Kangasharju et al., 2002). Second,
the impact of unemployment is not restricted to the person unemployed but af-
fects the whole family. Persons living in high unemployment regions have more
likely either themselves or via a family member or a friend been touched by
unemployment. Besides, the respondents living in low unemployment regions
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are likely to have diﬀerent perceptions of the aggregate economy than those
living in high unemployment regions. Third, the local unemployment receives
attention in the local media. Hence, it is a well-known economic indicator.
Finnish studies show that, especially from 1991 to 1993, the medias interest in
the economy increased. From 1988 to 1997, approximately 20% of all the news
stories were about the economy. In other words, along the unemployment rose
also the number of articles on the topic. SpeciÞcally, in the local newspapers
the local economic aspect was emphasized in the crisis period. (Aslama et al.,
2002) These Þndings give a reason to assume that citizens were aware of their
regions economy as well as the whole countrys economy.
Table 1. Average unemployment in diﬀerent regions and in diﬀerent periods
calculated as weighted averages of municipal monthly rates.
Region 1992-95 1996-01
Uusimaa 14.8 10.9
Vars.-Suomi 16.8 13.1
Satakunta 19.9 17.4
Häme 19.6 16.3
Pirkanmaa 19.5 16.0
Kymi 18.8 17.1
Etelä-Savo 19.8 18.3
Pohj.-Savo 19.3 17.8
P-Karjala 20.9 21.2
K-Suomi 21.0 18.4
E-Pohjanmaa 17.1 13.9
Pohjanmaa 10.7 12.6
P-Pohjanmaa 20.1 16.8
Kainuu 23.0 22.5
Lappi 23.7 22.7
Besides the economic development, there are other factors that can promote
the regional distinctiveness. A concept related to the non-economic regional
inßuence is the so-called neighborhood eﬀect (Miller, 1977), which includes the
strengthening of the traditional party aﬃliations in the region. The voters
whose class-based vote choice would be something else voted for the party, which
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had the strongest position in that region. In addition, in the diﬀerent local
environments political events are understood and interpreted diﬀerently. The
local media has a role in building the local atmosphere which aﬀects attitudes
and behavior (Johnston and Pattie, 1998). In Table 2, we list the government
approval rates in the Finnish provinces. The Þrst period covers the years of
the right government, the second the years of a wider coalition government.
The approval rates follow closely the results of the parliamentary elections.
The Centre Party was the largest party in all the three parliamentary elections
held in the 1990s in Pohjois-Savo, Vaasa (Pohjanmaa), Oulu (includes Kainuu),
Lappi; in addition, in 1991 and 1999 in Etelä-Savo and Keski-Suomi. The Social
Democratic Party was the biggest party in all three elections in Satakunta, Häme
and Kymi. Helsinki and Uusimaa are the strongholds of the National Coalition
Party. Concrete issues in which the regions diverge are for example preferences
on industry speciÞc subsidies and the attitudes towards the EU.
Table 2. Government approval rates by regions.
Region Whole 1992-95 1995-01
National 40.1 19.1 51.9
Uusimaa 46.6 17.2 63.7
Vars.-Suomi 40.3 16.5 54.8
Satakunta 35.6 15.9 49.8
Häme 41 20.4 52.8
Pirkanmaa 40 16.1 53.3
Kymi 38.3 15.9 52.0
Etelä-Savo 37.7 18.9 48.5
Pohj.-Savo 39.9 19.7 49.9
P-Karjala 34.5 15.8 49.0
K-Suomi 39.9 32.2 43.4
E-Pohjanmaa 34.1 23.9 39.9
Pohjanmaa 45.6 31.5 51.0
P-Pohjanmaa 37.3 23.2 44.9
Kainuu 27.1 10.8 31.8
Lappi 33.6 20.6 40.7
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2.2 Some Other Aspects of the Economic Development3
The recession of the 1990s does not Þt into the frames of a usual economic
downturn. Typical of the depression was the huge increase in the unemployment
rate, from 3 % in 1990 to almost 20% in 1994. Annual average growth rate from
1991 to 1993 was -3.8%. Even if the depression left almost everyone worse oﬀ
compared to the prior situation, or as Lehtinen (1998) puts it everyone lost,
not all the groups beneÞtted equally of the subsequent economic growth and
the increase of the employment opportunities.
Unemployment
The nature of the unemployment changes in the observation period. In the
beginning, it is cyclical unemployment due to the sudden and unforeseeable
changes in the economy. Then it becomes structural unemployment as a more
profound change in the society takes place. In the crisis, jobs were lost mostly
in construction and manufacturing, in the recovery period the new jobs were
created mainly in the service sector. The mismatch between the unemployed
and the new jobs gave rise to the structural unemployment. (Koskela and Uusi-
talo, 2003) The relative position of the unemployed worsened as their average
disposable incomes declined in the 1990s. In the latter half of the 1990s the un-
employed were more often long-term unemployed who receive the means-tested
minimum unemployment security beneÞt. Therefore since 1994 the unemployed
have lived more often in poverty (less than 50% national average income) than
in 1994. (Riihelä et al., 2002)
Groupwise investigation of the unemployment development tells the follow-
ing. Womens unemployment never reached the level of mens unemployment
(both peaked in 1994). But there was also a diﬀerence in the declining pro-
cess: male unemployment declined faster than female unemployment and in
1997 male unemployment was lower than female. Unemployment rose in every
educational group but in the crisis the gap widened between the highest and
the lowest educational group. Those having polytechnic degrees experienced the
fastest increase in employment opportunities after the crisis.
Decline of employment hurt most the youngest (18-25 years) age group.
3Based on Vartia and Kiander 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
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When the unemployment is disaggregated by age, then the elderly (45-59 years)
have overrepresentation. Elderly with low education have the weakest job mar-
ket position but unemployment has remained high among the lowest educated
young people, too. In the end of 1990s, the lowest educational group made up
the largest group when unemployment is disaggregated by education.
Incomes
In the crisis, the highest educated experienced the smallest decline in income.
In the Þrst recovery years the wages of all educational groups grew similarly,
only the lowest educational group had a little lower wage growth. Since 1996
the highest educated have had also the highest wage increases. Depression inßu-
enced most the wage incomes of the age group under 40 (in 2001). The average
wage incomes in the group under 40 in the end of 1990s was lower than the
same age groups in the beginning of 1990s. Only the highest educated under
40 have experienced average income increases. Pensioners relative position in
income distribution even improved (Lehtinen, 1998).
Income distribution
In the depression period from 1990 to 1993 increase in unemployment caused
signiÞcant changes in the relative distribution of the factor incomes but these
changes were not transmitted to the relative distribution of the disposable in-
comes. Contribution of the income transfers to the tranquility of the disposable
incomes was larger than that of the progressive income taxation. (Lehtinen
1998)
Income inequality between individuals has increased in the 1990s. First,
the reason was piling unemployment in the crisis years (1990-94), afterwards
the capital incomes, as their share in earnings has increased. In addition, in-
come redistribution has declined in the 1990s. Gini coeﬃcients calculated sepa-
rately for diﬀerent socio-economic groups (farmers, entrepreneurs, white collars,
blue collars, workers, unemployed, pensioners) show increased inequality within
these groups. From 1994 to 1998 the biggest increases in inequality occured in
the households headed by pensioners, farmers, entrepreneurs and white collars.
(Riihelä et al., 2002)
According to Ritakallio (2002) poverty is increasingly likely to be connected
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to ones socio-economic position (labour market status, education, social posi-
tion). In addition, social assistance and over-indebtness is linked to low educa-
tion and blue-collar workers. Further, from 1995 to 2000 the relative position
of single-parent families worsened but feminization of the poverty did not occur
in Finland.
Values
Divergence occurred also on the mental level. The decline of conformity of
the Finnish values strengthened in the crisis, solidarity towards the less-well-
oﬀ decreased among middle-aged, educated and Southerners. Furthermore, the
rural-urban divide was born. (Aslama et al., 2002) On one hand, the well-oﬀ
people were not solidaristic, on the other hand, the less-well-oﬀ did not them-
selves unite and bring up their cause and constitute a political force (Häkkinen
and Peltola, 2002).
3 Data and Specification of the Popularity Func-
tion
3.1 Data
Our data is gathered by Gallup Finland for Kaleva-newspaper. The data con-
sists of biannual random samples of the Finnish voting age (over 18 years)
population. On average there are 950 respondents in each poll (ranging from
914 to 1428). There are on average 300 respondents per survey excluded from
the data due to no answer to the government approval question, that leaves us
with approximately 650 respondents in each survey. The exclusion may slightly
aﬀect the representativeness of the sample since those excluded may have dif-
ferent response patterns also otherwise. The average respondent is 46 years old
and 48% of the respondents are women. Diﬀerent respondents have been inter-
viewed every time. Thus, the observations are independent, but not identically
distributed. The Þrst poll employed here is Spring 1992 and the last is Autumn
20014, that is altogether 15 observations in time. These features make the data
set a pooled cross-section.
4Unfortunately, not all the surveys of the period were available from Gallup Finland.
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The questionnaire is designed by Gallup Finland, the survey questions diﬀer
from time to time as well as the answer classiÞcations. In telephone interviews
the respondents have been asked of their government, prime ministerial and
presidential approval. Further, their vote intention and voting in the last elec-
tion held (either parliamentary or local) is asked. Of the socio-economic and
demographic variables the following are recorded: age, sex, education, income
class, occupational class, residential region (municipal) and labor market status.
The exact coding of the variables is reported in Appendix 1. Since the original
survey data includes the residential municipal of each respondent, it provides
an easy way to append the data set with local unemployment rates. We add the
NUTS3-level unemployment rates. As geographical units, the NUTS3-regions
are very close to the well-known provinces.
As the surveys cover several years and three electoral periods, it is meaningful
to divide the data into two subperiods according to the government coalition
(Table 3). The Þrst period covers the years from 1992 to 1995, and the latter
from 1996 to 2001. This division is practical also from the point of view of
our hypotheses. From 1992 to 2001, Finland was governed by three multiparty
coalitions. Party combination in the last two coalitions was essentially the same.
The Þrst coalition was a pure rightist government but after that the country
was governed by a combination of parties from the left to the right. (See Table
4) The latter coalition is usually called the rainbow coalition.
Table 3. Periods and observations.
Period Polls Month/year Average obs. Total N
1992-95 5 4/92, 9/92, 690 3454
4/93, 12/93, 5/94
1996-01 10 4/96, 4/97, 11/97, 610 6100
11/98, 5/99, 11/99,
4/00, 11/00, 3/01, 11/01
Sum 15 637 9554
As Table 4 shows, there is a huge increase in the government average pop-
ularity from the Þrst period to the latter. This diﬀerence can not be explained
just by the increased number of parties in the coalition. The Þrst period coin-
cides quite exactly with the deepest phase of the depression and the Þrst signs
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of recovery. The governments popularity level during the crisis signals a widely
felt discontent with the governments policies and actions.
Table 4. Government popularity (%) and incumbents in diﬀerent periods.
Mean Std Max Min Incumbent parties
1992-95 19.1 39.3 23.2 15.3 NC, CENT, SSPP, CD
1996-01 51.9 49.9 65.8 31.9 NC, SDP, LA, GL, SSPP
Abbreviations: NC (National Coalition), SSPP (Swedish Speaking Peoples Party), SDP
(Social Democratic Party), CENT (Finnish Centre Party), LA (Left Alliance), GL (Green
League), CD (Christian Democratic Party).
In Table 5, the government popularities are listed by socio-economic groups
(See Appendix 1 for the abbreviations and classiÞcations). The whole period
average popularities within groups depends on the size of each group in each
period. The sizes may vary somewhat, due to the diﬀerent number of surveys
available in each period.
3.2 Specification of the Popularity Function
The nature and composition of the data determines the estimation method. In
a panel data, the same individuals are observed over time, whereas in a cross-
sectional data, there is only one observation on each individual. This diﬀerence
is reßected in the modeling of the data (See Appendix 1 for details). In our
data, the dependent variable is dichotomous; the respondent either approves the
government (=1) or does it not (=0). The explanatory variables include both
binary and continuous variables. There are several possibilities for estimating a
binary response model. The cross-sectional nature of the data leads to a static
model. All the static methods for pure cross-sectional data are applicable to
our data, too.
Another issue in picking the estimation method is how to correctly take the
time-speciÞc eﬀects into account. It is possible to separate the time-speciÞc
eﬀects either by using Þxed-eﬀects model or to highlight the time-speciÞc eﬀects
by dummies in a random eﬀects model.
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Table 5. Government popularity by groups and time periods.
Whole 1992-95 1996-01
Total 40.1 19.1 51.9
Gender Male 40.6 18.5 52.7
Female 39.6 19.8 51.2
Age 18-25 40.4 20.0 63.1
25-34 34.9 14.9 51.4
35-49 35.7 16.2 47.3
50-64 44.0 19.5 53.4
64+ 47.7 32.4 53.6
Education No-training 26.5 15.6 33.3
Vocational 41.9 20.9 53.7
Polytechnic 37.8 17.5 52.3
Academic 39.8 17.7 48.7
Income Below mid 43.4 20.1 53.4
Mid 36.9 19.4 48.8
Above mid 39.9 15.9 49.1
Socio Farmer 35.1 46.8 29.9
Entrepreneur 41.6 19.6 51.2
White collar 43.4 19.6 56.3
Blue collar 33.1 10.4 49.6
Labour Employed 51.6
market Unemployed 44.4
Voted for SDP 46.8 8.1 80.3
CENT 38.1 64 28.9
NC 62.1 36.3 71.7
LA 23.1 5.3 42.7
The Þxed eﬀects method assumes that there is a group-speciÞc constant
term, deÞning the group is up to the theory or the researcher. The dummy
approach can be applied to any random eﬀects logit or probit model. According
to several textbook sources the logit and probit estimations would yield similar
results (Hsiao, 2003, Wooldridge, 2002). Considering our data and the aim of
the study, it is easy to make a decision between the methods.
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Our data consists of repeated random samples of voting age population, and
every data combination applied in our study includes a few thousand obser-
vations. While using a survey data, the basic idea is to make inferences with
respect to the underlying population characteristics, not only with respect to
the eﬀects in the sample. This line of thought excludes the use of Þxed-eﬀects
model which is generally considered to yield inferences conditional on the ef-
fects in the sample (Hsiao, 2003). Therefore, our starting point is the maximum
likelihood random eﬀects probit with the time-speciÞc dummies. The estimated
model is as follows,
(1) Gi,t = βo + λt + β1Wi,t + β2Ij,t + εi,t,
where Gi,t denotes government approval by individual i at time t, λt includes
the time speciÞc dummies (assumed random and estimated along with the other
explanatory variables),Wi,t includes the individual-level characteristics (like ed-
ucation, sex, etc.) and Ij,t is the group-level economic indicator, in this case
either the local unemployment or the provincial dummy indicating respondents
home province. There are two practices to explore whether the poll respondents
with diﬀerent socio-economic characteristics approve of the government diﬀer-
ently. Firstly, to use these characteristics as explanators. Secondly, to group
the whole data according to the feature and estimate the popularity function in
the subset of the data. We apply both approaches. The latter approach means
running about some one hundred separate regressions. Not all the groupwise
estimations are expected to yield meaningful results, since each socio-economic
and demographic group consists of people with varied life-styles and values and
are not likely to share common interests in policy issues. Thus, it might be
diﬃcult to Þnd systematic approval patterns within groups.
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4 Estimation Results
In the following, we report the results variable by variable by Þrst citing the
respective hypothesis. In interpreting and discussing the results we apply the
evidence of the 1990s depression, the general knowledge of the Finnish political
behavior and evidence from international studies in our Þeld.
We begin by estimating the government popularity function for each sub-
periods separately. Our strategy is to hold as many factors Þxed as possible.
In other words, to include as many background variables in the regression as
available. In adding the variables to the equation, attention should be paid on
the possible multicollinearity that weakens the estimated inßuence.
An important issue in the probit models is the interpretation of both dis-
crete and continuous explanatory variables. Following the common practise,
we report in the text the marginal eﬀects with respective signiÞcance levels,
while the actual parameter estimates and their standard errors are printed in
Appendix 2. For a categorical variable, the marginal eﬀect is the change from
zero to one, holding all other variables Þxed. For a continuous variable, it is
the inÞnitesimal change evaluated at its mean level. Although the coeﬃcient
signs and signiÞcances are more relevant in judging the Þt of the model, we
also report the values of the likelihood function, pseudo-R2 and the percentage
correctly predicted. The statistical package used in the estimation is Stata 8.0.
In the following, we Þrst comment the periodwise results, then we make some
remarks on the subgroup results. In interpreting and discussing the results we
proceed variable by variable. First, we shortly review the hypothesis concerning
the variable, and then proceed to the results. Tables 5 and 6 give the complete
results of the popularity function estimations for the two government types. Ta-
ble 5 provides the results with the local unemployment, table 6 with the home
province dummies. The most interesting results of the within group estimations
are commented and the details of them are printed in Appendix 2, the rest of
the results are available from the author on request.
Overall, it seems that in the Þrst period the local unemployment, political
orientation, demographic variables, own economic situation and the region of
residence are not very helpful in predicting the government approval. Whereas
exactly the same variables yield quite high a percentage of correctly predicted
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responses in the latter period. Reasons for this Þnding may lie in the very low
government popularity in the Þrst period (on average 19%, almost rare events
data), extraordinary economic development and the ongoing fast and thorough
transformation of the society, where the usual explanators do not have a place.
Unemployment
The responsibility hypothesis leads us to assume wider discontent with the
government among the respondents in the regions of high unemployment. As
the relationship between the respondents likelihood of support and the local
unemployment is nonlinear, it is meaningful to calculate the response proba-
bilities for low and high unemployment rates separately and then subtract the
low unemployment response probability from the high unemployment response
probability. Doing so gives us some very interesting results. In the Þrst pe-
riod, the respondents living in Lappi (the highest local unemployment, 25.6%)
are approximately 11 percentage points more likely to support the government
than the respondents in Uusimaa (the lowest local unemployment, 9.9%). In the
latter period, the respondents in Lappi (the local unemployment still 25.6%) are
approximately 23 percentage points less likely to support the government than
are the respondents in Uusimaa (the local unemployment 7.3%). In other words,
in case of the rightist government the respondents likelihood to support the gov-
ernment is positively aﬀected by the high local unemployment: the higher the
local unemployment, the higher the likelihood of supporting the government.
This Þnding is in stark contrast with the responsibility hypothesis, the results
in the international studies (Pattie and Johnston, 1995a, 1995b, Johston et al.,
2000) and the Finnish studies involving the aggregate-level variables, where it
was found that especially in its government period the Centre Party and the
National Coalition are punished for the unemployment (Asikainen, 2002). It
seems that entering the regional level completely changes the picture. However,
an apparent explanation for these opposite results lies to a great extent in the
regional distinctiveness in the party support concentrating around the Centre
Party. The Centre Party has a historically dominant position in the sparsely
populated rural areas in Northern and Eastern Finland, where nowadays the
unemployment rates are high. In those areas the Centre Party has long been a
catch-all party (Arter, 1999) and it seems that the poor local economic devel-
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opment wont change that.
On average the unemployment rate in the Centre Partys core areas does not
essentially change from the Þrst period to the latter. Nonetheless, the attitude
towards the local unemployment changes as the government coalition changes.
In the Þrst period - interpretation according to the responsibility hypothesis
- it is not the governments fault, but in the latter period the government is
punished for the high local unemployment. Besides, in its opposition period the
Centre Party has strongly forwarded the message of governments inaction in
smoothing the regional disparities. Obviously, the message has hit home at the
target audiences, namely, Northern and Eastern provinces.
Another unexpected feature is that being unemployed oneself does not have
a signiÞcant inßuence on the approval likelihood. Let us bear in mind the fact
the respondents labour market status is recorded only in the surveys of the
two last electoral periods. After the mid-1990s the nature of the unemploy-
ment began to transform into structural unemployment, which includes persons
with dated skills and education. Here it is impossible to separate the long-term
unemployment from seasonal and cyclical unemployment. It is very likely that
the reason for unemployment as well as age, education etc. aﬀects ones ex-
pectations of the future and thus makes this group quite heterogenous. To get
a more educated opinion on the topic whether unemployed approve the gov-
ernment diﬀerently, we estimate the model within the group of unemployed.
There are altogether 396 unemployed respondents in the surveys. The results
show two dissimilarities compared to the results in Table 5: the unemployed
entrepreneurs increased likelihood to disapprove of the government. The other
diﬀerence is that the unemployed National Coalitions voters are more likely to
approve of the government than for example the Social Democratic Partys un-
employed voters. The unemployed National Coalition voters do not blame the
government for their unemployment, as they are even more likely to approve of
the government than the other National Coalitions voters.
20
Table 6. Estimation results on the government popularity function for diﬀerent
periods with local unemployment.
1992-95 1995-01
Polls Au92/Sp97 -0.09** 0.06*
Au93/Au97 -0.1* 0.02
Sp93/Au98 -0.1** 0.04
Sp94/Au99 -0.04 0.04
Sp00 0.05
Au00 -0.04
Sp01 -0.01
Au01 0.05
Govt2 0.24**
Gender Female 0.006 0.01
Age 18-24 -0.07 0.17**
25-34 -0.12** 0.02
35-49 -0.13** -0.03
50-64 -0.11** 0.02
Education Notraining -0.07 -0.15*
Vocational -0.07 -0.03
Polytechnic -0.06 -0.04
Academic -0.09* -0.06*
Socio Farmer 0.09 -0.15**
Entrepreneur -0.07 -0.003
White-collar -0.03 0.02
Blue-collar -0.12** -0.02
Pensioner 0.00 0.01
Income Below-mid 0.004 -0.06*
Mid 0.01 -0.06*
Above-mid -0.000 -0.07**
*(**) = statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
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Table 6 continues. Results for diﬀerent periods with local unemployment.
1992-95 1995-01
Voted for SDP -0.09** 0.37**
NC 0.3** 0.25**
CENT 0.5** -0.15**
LEFT -0.14** 0.02
GREEN -0.11** 0.03
Local LU 0.007 -0.01**
N 3453 6100
pseudo R2 0.22 0.16
log likelihood -1312.3 -3541.4
% corr. pred 12.4 53.6
*(**) = statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
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Table 7. Estimation results on the government popularity function for diﬀerent
periods with regional dummies.
1992-95 1995-01
Poll Au92/Sp97 -0.06 0.08*
Au93/Au97 -0.04 0.07*
Sp93/Au98 -0.05 0.1**
Sp94/Sp99 0.02 0.01
Au99 0.06*
Sp00 0.07*
Sp01 0.01
Au01 0.09**
Govt2 0.29**
Residence Vars.Suomi -0.05 -0.06*
Satakunta -0.03 -0.08*
Häme 0.07 -0.08**
Pirkanmaa -0.007 -0.08**
Kymi -0.001 -0.11**
Etelä-Savo 0.07 -0.09*
Pohj.-Savo 0.05 -0.07*
P-Karjala -0.03 -0.13**
K-Suomi 0.19** -0.14**
E-Pohjanmaa -0.07 -0.14**
Pohjanmaa 0.15* -0.09**
P-Pohjanmaa -0.01 -0.1**
Kainuu -0.1 -0.24**
Lappi 0.06 -0.14**
Gender Female 0.003 0.01
Age 18-24 -0.06 0.17**
25-34 -0.12** 0.02
35-49 -0.12** -0.02
50-64 -0.1** 0.02
*(**) = statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
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Table 7 continues. Results for diﬀerent periods with regional dummies.
1992-95 1995-01
Education Notraining -0.07 -0.18*
Vocational -0.07 -0.04
Polytechnic -0.06 -0.06*
Academic -0.09* -0.06*
Socio Farmer 0.11 -0.15**
Entrepreneur -0.06 0.001
White-collar -0.04 0.02
Blue-collar -0.12** -0.02
Pensioner 0.01 0.01
Income Below-mid 0.002 -0.06**
Mid 0.01 -0.06**
Above-mid -0.007 -0.07**
Voted for SDP -0.1** 0.36**
NC 0.3** 0.25**
CENT 0.5** -0.15**
LEFT -0.15** -0.02
GREEN -0.11** 0.03
N 3453 6100
pseudo R2 0.23 0.16
log likelihood -1296.9 -3530.1
% corr. pred 12.4 53.6
*(**) = statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
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Region
We included the home province dummy for each respondent as we wished
to capture the non-economic eﬀects that living in a certain province may have.
The results are displayed in Table 7. Since it is not possible to include all the
regions in one regression at the same time, we dropped Uusimaa. It seems
to be a natural comparison group because Uusimaa features as the forerunner
in the economic development within the provinces. Multicollinearity makes it
impossible to add local unemployment or any kinds of interactions with it to
the same regression with the province dummies. Thus, it is diﬃcult to exclude
the possible inßuence of the economy.
In the Þrst subperiod, we Þnd expectably the dominant position of the Cen-
tre Party in certain regions. The respondents living Keski-Suomi and Pohjan-
maa were 19% and 15% more likely to approve of the government than the
respondents in the other regions. For the other regions the coeﬃcients were
not signiÞcant. In the latter period, the diﬀerences between regions are more
pronounced. It is diﬃcult to say whether it is caused by the change of the gov-
ernment coalition, or by the change of times generally. The highest likelihood
of not approving of the government is in Kainuu, second comes Lappi, third
Etelä-Pohjanmaa and fourth Keski-Suomi. The result is not surprising as the
Þrst two are Northern regions of low incomes, high unemployment and high
vote share of the Centre Party. In addition, the latter two regions belong to
the Centre Partys core areas and, thus, it is natural to see the low government
approval there.
Political orientation
We assumed that the party the respondent voted for in the last elections
reßects ones political orientation. Therefore, we expect that the incumbency
of ones latest electoral choice increases ones likelihood to approve of the gov-
ernment. That is also the case. The coalition change is visible as those who
voted for the Social Democratic Party become more likely to approve of the gov-
ernment in the latter period and, respectively, the voters of the Centre Party
become less likely to approve of it. These results indicate that the Centre Party
voters are more inclined than the other parties voters to approve or disapprove
of the government according to their favorite partys parliamentary position.
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The voters of the Left Alliance are less likely to approve of the right govern-
ment, but in the second period the partys incumbency leaves them indiﬀerent
towards the government.
The National Coalitions incumbency stretches over the entire research pe-
riod, and its voters are from 25 to 30% more likely to approve of the both
government types than others. Maybe due to its long incumbency, the voters
of the National Coalitions main coalition partner are more likely to approve
of the government. When the Centre Party is the partner, its voters are 50%
more likely approve of the government. In the latter period, the voters of the
Social Democratic Party are 36% more likely to approve of the government.
The stronger adherence may be due to the prime ministers position held by the
Centre Party and later by the Social Democratic Party. Often the government
is personiÞed in good and in bad to the prime minister.
In the Þrst period, an interesting observation is that the blue collar Centre
Party voters were 22 % less likely to approve of the government, this Þnding
is naturally explained by the groups aversion for the National Coalition. In
addition, the Centre Party voters with less than 49 years of age or with high
incomes were from 22 to 28 % less likely to approve of the right government.
Maybe these groups include the so-called swing voters who just happened to
vote for the Centre Party in the latest election but do not belong to its core
supporters.
In addition, here we document clear evidence that not all the incumbent
party voters approve of the government. Thus, the summing up of the party
popularities to get the government coalition popularity leads to biased numbers.
Socio-occupational group
Finland has a history of strongly class-based party support. Growing class
dealignment on the voters side and the parties transformation from class-based
parties to catch-all parties have obviously weakened the ties. In addition, new
parties have emerged to catch the voters. Yet, it still is common knowledge that
the Social Democratic Party basis its support on blue-collar workers, the Centre
Party on farmers and rural residents, and the National Coalition on white-collar
workers.
Our results indicate that the farmers and the blue-collar workers have class-
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based approval behavior. The blue-collar workers are more likely than any other
groups to disapprove of the right government, whereas the farmers are several
times more likely to disapprove of the rainbow coalition which excludes the
Centre Party. These results suggest that the class-based support comes actually
up as non-support. This inverse inßuence may reßect the dealignment process
as these voter groups - the farmers and the blue-collars - know what they oppose
(the SDP led government, the rightist government) but are no longer strongly
for their traditional party.
Besides, among the farmers the discontent felt with the government in the
latter period may be mixed with their disapproval of the European Union. In
the period of 1995-99 issues related to EU received a lot of attention in the media
(Aslama et al., 2002) and it is a topic heavily promoted by the government.
Gender
There is international evidence showing emerging of a gender gap in vot-
ing and party support. Hence, we expect to discover some gender diﬀerences
also here. We Þnd that gender does not make one more likely to approve or
disapprove of the government and this holds for both government types. Nev-
ertheless, diﬀerences arise when we estimate the same model for both genders
separately (results in Appendix 2, tables 3-4). It is the education that makes
the diﬀerence. One diﬀerence comes from the eﬀect of having notraining. In the
latter period, it decreases 21% mens likelihood to approve of the government
whereas it does not signiÞcantly change womens approval likelihood. Here we
probably have the phenomena which the being unemployed oneself -variable did
not catch. The men without training have a weak job market position, thus,
facing higher risks of economic adversaries. In addition, this group of men faces
social risks of becoming estranged from the society. Social assistance and over-
indebtness is linked to low education in 1995-2000 (Ritakallio, 2002) Thus, this
is a less-well-oﬀ group, or at the risk of becoming one, that might oppose the
governments policies directed at welfare services and transfers.
At least as fascinating a Þnding concerns the highly educated women. In
the Þrst government period, we Þnd that the academic women are 14% less
likely to approve of the government, in the latter period, the percentage drops
to 10%. In the latter period, the discontent has spread as the women having
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polytechnic education are 8% more likely to disapprove of the government. All
in all, the academic women are more unsatisÞed with the outcomes delivered by
any government type.
Obviously, critical thinking increases along with education and the target of
the criticism can justiÞably be the government as well as any other instance.
Strikingly, the same increase in criticism towards the government does not hap-
pen to men. In the following, we try to reason an explanation. Firstly, interna-
tional evidence shows that women increasingly tend to favour the left parties.
This is assumed to be connected to the increasing number of divorces which
lead to the increasing number of single-parent households, where the parent
most likely is the mother. The left parties favour redistributive policies, part of
which are targeted to children and low-income households. (Edlund and Pande,
2002, Edlund et al., 2003) Secondly, Finnish studies show that in the 1990s the
redistributional eﬀorts by the government have declined (Riihelä et al., 2001),
in the recovery from the depression the government put heavier weight on cut-
backs in the public expenditures than on the increases of taxes (Kautto, 2001),
not only the level of the social beneÞts has lowered but also eligibility to the
transfers has become more diﬃcult in the 1990s (Lehtonen et al., 2002) and
the single-parent households relative position has worsened (Ritakallio, 2002).
Connecting the Þrst and the second point, we suggest that the academic (and
polytechnic) women might oppose the governments policies that lead to decline
in the welfare services. These women may see the transfers and services as insur-
ances against being less-well-oﬀ themselves if they end up as single-parents. Our
reasoning needs clariÞcation on the part that why it is just the highly educated
women who are more likely to disapprove of the government since also the less
educated women must concretely face the problems of the single parenthood.
The highly educated women are likely to be married to the highly educated and
high earning men. The gender wage gap is the wider the higher is the educa-
tional level. Thus, the in case of a divorce the highly educated women lose more
in relative terms than their less educated sisters who are likely to be married to
men with lower incomes. The public transfers replace a lower percentage of the
lost incomes in high income families and further declines in the transfers may
increase the highly educated womens discontent with the policymaking.
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Another explanation for the Þnding might come from somewhat diﬀerent
direction5. The discontent felt by the highly educated women might be directed
at the societywide attitudes and often invisible structures that end up limiting
their possibilities to make use of their skills and capacities at full. As young
(18-25 years), they do not realize this but rather have an optimistic view on
policymaking supporting the government. With age and the education the dis-
illusionment is associated with increasing critisism towards the decisionmaking
bodies.
Age
The oldest age group (over 65 years) had to be excluded due to multi-
collinearity, but the respondents in that group are well represented in the socio-
occupational group pensioners. Each age group consists of people with varied
lifestyles and values. Actually, it would be surprising to Þnd coherent opinions
towards the government within age groups. But there are those, as we will
learn. In the Þrst periods results we notice that young people (18-25 years)
have more positive views of the government compared to other age groups. In
the latter period, the young are several times more likely to approve of the gov-
ernment than others are. More precisely, the results show that belonging to the
youngest age group increases ones likelihood of approving of the government
by 17 %. An interesting Þnding is also that in the latter period the women in
the youngest age group are more likely to approve of the government than the
men in the respective age group. This result might reßect the overall optimism
of the young. This view is supported by the survey results reported by Aslama
et al. (2002). They conclude that young people regarded the crisis as some
sort of survival training, ie. did not see as an end of era or not in very neg-
ative terms. Estimation within the age groups tells that socialization to ones
socio-occupational group begins early since already in the youngest age group
the blue-collar workers are 16 % less likely to approve of the rightist government
than others.
5The following reasoning has arisen in discussions with Professor Mikkola.
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Education
We expect educational divide to be seen in the opinions of those having no-
training. As is reported above, the overall position of no-trained has weakened
in the 1990s. Our results show that in the Þrst period, the only educational
group signiÞcantly more likely than others to disapprove of the government is
the academic. In the latter period, the no-training group is 17 % more likely to
disapprove of the government. In addition, having either academic or polytech-
nic education increases ones likelihood to disapprove but not as largely. The
diﬀerences in the sizes of the inßuence between educational groups are large, and
they may reßect worsening labour market position and income development of
those having no training.
Income
In the Þrst period there is 22 % and in the latter period 24.7 % of respondents
who do not tell their incomes. In the Þrst period, belonging to any of the income
groups does not inßuence ones opinion on the government. In the latter period,
the eﬀects are signiÞcant but about the same size in each of the income groups.
5 Conclusion
In this study we analysed the inßuence of local unemployment, political orienta-
tion and socio-economic background on individual citizens government approval
in the 1990s. Diverging economic development between and within regions and
groups lead us assume divergent behavior also with respect to the government.
The period under study covers years of the rightist coalition from 1991 to 1995
and the years of almost-all-inclusive rainbow coalition from 1995 to 2001. Thus,
the models are estimated for each of the diﬀerent government types separately.
Several aspects of our Þndings complement the existing evidence on both the
depression and the Finnish voting and approval behavior. We Þnd that during
the incumbency of the right government (1991-95), a high local unemployment
did not increase ones likelihood of approving of the government. For the latter
part of the 1990s, the era of the multi-party coalition, the result is just the op-
posite. In addition, we document the inter-regional approval diﬀerences without
the direct connection to the level of the local unemployment. The government
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approval in diﬀerent provinces reßects the long-standing regional divide in the
party support. These results are clearly aﬀected by the dominant position of
the Centre Party in the Northern and Eastern provinces.
The incumbency of the respondents last voted for party expectedly in-
creases the likelihood of government support. Class dealignment is obvious
in our results, since only the farmers and the blue-collar workers approval pat-
tern slightly resembles the class-based support. Remarkable though is that the
class-based behavior occurs as non-support , ie. as disapproval of the right
government (blue-collars) or of the SDP lead government (farmers). From 1996
to 2001, among the male respondents the likelihood of approval is signiÞcantly
lower for those having no-training, whereas, among the female respondents the
lower approval likelihood in the whole period occurs in the group of academic
women, and for the period from 1996 to 2001 also among the polytechnic women.
These male and female groups are deÞnitely not similar, although they have the
higher likelihood of disapproval in common. We suggests that these groups ei-
ther concretely face or are conscious of their risks of being less-well-oﬀ. For
the male group the risks consist of weak job market position, unemployment,
poverty and becoming estranged from the society. The female group is probably
aware of the challenges related to single-parenthood and the relatively weakened
position of single-parent families in the 1990s. Our suggestion is in line with
the international evidence of womens increased likelihood of disapproving the
social transfer cutbacks.
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Appendix 1: Description of Data
Data Type
Panel data and cross sectional data diﬀer in modeling from each other to
some extent. A general model for both data types is
(1) y∗i,t = β
0
xi,t + vi,t
where y∗i,t is individual is response at time t, xi,t includes explanatory vari-
ables connected to the individual i at time t and vi,t is the error term. The
crucial diﬀerence comes from the way the error term can be decomposed. In the
panel data, it is possible to decompose the error term into three parts:
(2) vi,t = λt + αi + ui,t,
where αi stands for the individual eﬀects and λt represents the time-speciÞc
eﬀects. In the repeated cross-sectional data the individual-speciÞc eﬀects can
not be accounted for due to the lack of repeated observations on the same
individual. Thus, the error term can be decomposed as
(3) vi,t = λt + ui,t,
including only the time-speciÞc eﬀects and the error term.
Survey Variables
These opinion polls by Gallup Finland are originally not designed for aca-
demic purposes. Although they are conducted biannually starting in 1985, I
was not able get all the material collected so far. Thus, this study includes 15
surveys from Spring 1992 to Autumn 2001, excluding polls of Spring 1995 and
Autumns 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998. Not all the surveys include all the ques-
tions which limits the setting of the research questions. Nevertheless, this is a
valuable source when we are interested in the factors aﬀecting the government
support on the individual-level. The recorded background variables oﬀer much
information on the respondents living circumstances. The interviews were done
32
over the phone and each poll includes 900-1500 respondents. Below is the list-
ing and deÞnitions of the variables used in this study. Usually, Gallup Finlands
original answer scaling has several options. For purpose of this study the scal-
ing is in many cases simpliÞed. Details on the variables drawn from the Gallup
Finland surveys are as follows.
1. GENDER male=0, female=1.
2. AGE The respondents are asked their age in years. Then the answer is
classiÞed to a 7-point scale. This is changed into an increasing scale of
5 points: under 25, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64, over 65. Age is included also
without scales.
3. EDUCATION Due to the changes in the education system over the years
Gallup has used diﬀerent coding conventions. Original coding has been
slightly changed. The basic idea in re-coding is to 1 = no professional
training (elementary school), 2 = vocational school apprenticeship train-
ing, 3 = matriculation exam or polytechnic degrees, 4 = academic degrees,
0= other.
5. INCOME Both in the polls and in the oﬃcial statistics information
on gross incomes is collected by households. Gallup asks the respondent
his/her households gross income class. The original scales that Gallup
uses diﬀer a lot from poll to poll. For that reason it is impossible to
construct any other than the following division: less than middle income,
middle income, more than middle income. First, the reported income
classes are converted into 2001 prices. Second, the middle income for each
year is checked in the yearly income statistics by Statistics Finland. The
category including the middle income is entitled to middle income (2), all
observations below it to below average (1) and the rest to above average
(3) or no answer (0).
6. SOCIO-OCCUPATIONAL GROUP This variable is a result of combin-
ing several questions. The aim is to categorize the occupational status of
the household in which the respondent is living. We apply the following
Gallups questions: 1. what is your occupation? 2. are you yourself the
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primary breadwinner in your household? 3. what is the occupation of
the primary breadwinner in your household? We apply the general proce-
dure to classify the occupational status of the household according to its
main breadwinner. The alternatives for occupational status are: farmer,
entrepreneur, leading position or white collar, blue collar, pensioner, stu-
dent, other (includes stay-at-home moms and dads).
7. LSTATUS (EMPLOYED/UNEMPLOYED) This variable tells the respon-
dents labor market status. Original codes employed, unemployed, for
other reasons outside the labor force, no answer.
8. LCYCLE What is the phase of the life cycle you are living at the moment?
live with your parents, live alone/single, with a spouse, with spouse and
kids, single parent, other, no answer.
9. REGION Gallup asks in which municipal the respondent is living? Gallup
codes municipals using the Finnish municipal coding practice. When those
codes are known it is easy to construct diﬀerent regional units. Here we
have applied NUTS3 division, which is close to the Finnish provinces (Å
land excluded): Uusimaa, Varsinais-Suomi, Satakunta, Häme, Pirkanmaa,
Kaakkois-Suomi, Etelä-Savo, Pohjois-Savo, Pohjois-Karjala, Keski-Suomi,
Etelä-Pohjanmaa, Pohjanmaa, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa, Kainuu, Lappi.
10. GOVERNMENT APPROVAL (GOVT) How content you are with the
government lead by Prime Minister N.N.? Very, quite, both and, not
quite, not at all, no answer. These answer options are combined to result
a digital scale for positive and negative answers. Dont know and no
answer -answers are deleted.
11. PRIME MINISTERS APPROVAL RATE (PM) Do you approve the way
N.N. is handling his job as the Prime Minister? Very much, quite much,
both and, not quite, not at all, no answer. These answer options are
combined to result a digital scale for positive and negative answers.
12. PRESIDENTS APPROVAL RATE (PRES) Do you approve the way N.N.
is handling his/her job as the President? Very much, quite much, both
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and, not quite, not at all, no answer. These answer options are combined
to result a digital scale for positive and negative answers.
13. VOTE INTENTION (PARTY) If parliamentary elections were held to-
morrow, which partys or other groups candidate would you voter for?
Socialdemocratic party (SDP), Centre Party (CENT), National Coalition
Party (NC), Left Alliance (LA), Green League (GL), Swedish Speaking
Peoples Party (SSPP), Christdemocratic Party (CD), Other, No answer
or dont know.
Other Variables
In addition to the variable above, the following variable were added to the
data set.
1. TIME To be able to identify separately each poll, the time variable is
included. It is a dummy variable. Its abbreviation is a combination of
the polling time (2 letters) and polling year (2 digits), for example a poll
conducted in the Spring 1992 is coded as Sp92 where Sp= Spring and
92=1992. For Autumn 2000 the code is Au00.
2. GOVT2 is a dummy variable applied in the latter periods regressions to
separate the second government period (starting in 1999) from the Þrst.
3. LOCAL UNEMPLOYMENT (LU) Monthly municipal unemployment rates
are collected by Ministry of Labour. Provincial unemployment rates are
calculated as the weighted average of municipal rates. Applied weight is
the number of labor force in municipal. There are two lags used for the
variable, one month and two months.
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Appendix 2
Table 1. Parameter coeﬃcients behind the marginal eﬀects in Table 5 in
text.
1992-95 [std] 1995-01 [std]
Poll Au92/Sp96 -0.25** [0.09]
Au93/Sp97 -0.28** [0.12] 0.16* [0.08]
Sp93/Au97 -0.31** [0.11] 0.06 [0.08]
Sp94/Au98 -0.12 [0.12] 0.09 [0.08]
Sp99 0.11 [0.08]
Au99 -0.11 [0.08]
Sp00 0.12 [0.08]
Au00 -0.1 [0.08]
Sp01 -0.03 [0.08]
Au01 0.12 [0.08]
Gender Female 0.02 [0.06] 0.03 [0.04]
Age 18-24 -0.19 [0.11] 0.43** [0.1]
25-34 -0.35** [0.1] 0.04 [0.08]
35-49 -0.37** [0.09] -0.07 [0.07]
50-64 -0.3** [0.09] 0.04 [0.06]
Education Notraining -0.21 [0.29] -0.44* [0.21]
Vocational -0.2 [0.11] -0.08 [0.07]
Polytechnic -0.16 [0.1] -0.12 [0.06]
Academic -0.27* [0.11] -0.16** [0.06]
Socio Farmer 0.24 [0.16] -0.44** [0.11]
Entrepreneur -0.19 [0.14] -0.007 [0.09]
White-collar -0.09 [0.11] 0.05 [0.08]
Blue-collar -0.36** [0.1] -0.05 [0.07]
Pensioner 0.002 [0.12] 0.02 [0.09]
Income Below-mid 0.01 [0.11] -0.17* [0.06]
Mid 0.03 [0.07] -0.17** [0.05]
Above-mid -0.002 [0.11] -0.19** [0.06]
*(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level
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Table 1. continues. Parameter coeﬃcients behind the marginal eﬀects in
Table 5 in text.
1992-95 [std] 1995-01 [std]
Voted for SDP -0.27** [0.08] 0.97** [0.05]
NC 0.77** [0.09] 0.64** [0.05]
CENT 1.43** [0.08] -0.43** [0.05]
LA -0.43** [0.15] -0.05 [0.09]
GREEN -0.32** [0.12] 0.09 [0.08]
LU 0.019 [0.01] -0.03** [0.002]
NC (National Coalition), SDP (Social Democratic Party), CENT (Finnish Centre Party),
LA (Left Alliance), GREEN (Green League)
*(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level
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Table 2. Parameter coeﬃcients behind the marginal eﬀects in Table 6 in
text.
1992-95 [std] 1995-01 [std]
Poll Au92/Sp97 -0.17* [0.09] 0.2* [0.08]
Au93/Au97 -0.1 [0.09] 0.17* [0.08]
Sp93/Au98 -0.16 [0.09] 0.25** [0.08]
Sp94/Sp99 -0.06 [0.09] 0.03 [0.08]
Au99 0.16* [0.08]
Sp00 0.17* [0.08]
Sp01 0.04 [0.08]
Au01 0.23** [0.08]
Govt2 0.75** [0.08]
Residence Vars.Suomi -0.13 [0.11] -0.15* [0.07]
Satakunta -0.09 [0.13] -0.22* [0.09]
Häme 0.17 [0.12] -0.22** [0.07]
Pirkanmaa -0.02 [0.12] -0.22** [0.07]
Kymi -0.004 [0.13] -0.28** [0.08]
E-Savo 0.18 [0.15] -0.25** [0.1]
P-Savo 0.13 [0.14] -0.18* [0.08]
P-Karjala -0.09 [0.15] -0.34** [0.1]
K-Suomi 0.48** [0.13] -0.39** [0.08]
E-Pohjanmaa -0.19 [0.13] -0.39** [0.09]
Pohjanmaa 0.39** [0.16] -0.25** [0.1]
Oulu -0.03 [0.12] -0.27** [0.08]
Kainuu -0.29 [0.34] -0.74** [0.14]
Lappi 0.15 [0.14] -0.40** [0.09]
Gender Female 0.01 [0.05] 0.03 [0.04]
Age 18-24 -0.17 [0.12] 0.43** [0.1]
25-34 -0.33** [0.11] 0.05 [0.08]
35-49 -0.36** [0.09] -0.06 [0.07]
50-64 -0.29** [0.09] 0.05 [0.06]
*(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level
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Table 2 continues. Parameter coeﬃcients behind the marginal eﬀects in
Table 6 in text..
1992-95 [std] 1995-01 [std]
Education Notraining -0.19 [0.3] -0.49* [0.2]
Vocational -0.19 [0.11] -0.11 [0.07]
Polytechnic -0.16 [0.1] -0.15* [0.07]
Academic -0.26** [0.12] -0.17* [0.07]
Socio Farmer 0.29 [0.16] -0.43** [0.11]
Entrepreneur -0.18 [0.14] 0.003 [0.09]
White-collar -0.1 [0.11] 0.05 [0.08]
Blue-collar -0.36** [0.11] -0.04 [0.07]
Pensioner 0.03 [0.12] 0.03 [0.09]
Income Below-mid 0.007 [0.11] -0.16* [0.06]
Mid 0.03 [0.07] -0.16** [0.05]
Above-mid -0.02 [0.11] -0.19** [0.06]
Voted for SDP -0.28** [0.08] 0.97** [0.05]
NC 0.77** [0.09] 0.63** [0.05]
CENT 1.46** [0.08] -0.42** [0.05]
LEFT -0.46** [0.15] -0.05 [0.09]
GREEN -0.32** [0.12] 0.07 [0.08]
NC (National Coalition), SDP (Social Democratic Party), CENT (Finnish Centre Party),
LA (Left Alliance), GREEN (Green League)
*(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level
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Table 3. Marginal eﬀects within gender groups.
1992-95 1992-95
Male Female
Poll Au92/Sp96 -0.06 -0.11*
Au93/Sp97 -0.07 -0.15*
Sp93/Au97 -0.1* -0.11*
Sp94/Au98 -0.06 -0.03
Age 18-24 -0.05 -0.09
25-34 -0.14** -0.1*
35-49 -0.12** -0.13**
50-64 -0.1* -0.11*
Education Notraining -0.2 0.04
Vocational -0.04 -0.1
Polytechnic -0.03 -0.08
Academic -0.03 -0.14**
Socio Farmer 0.06 0.13
Entrepreneur -0.08 -0.05
White-collar -0.05 -0.02
Blue-collar -0.11* -0.12*
Pensioner 0.04 0.07
Income Below-mid -0.00 0.01
Mid 0.01 0.03
Above-mid 0.02 -0.03
Voted for SDP -0.04 -0.13**
NC 0.3** 0.34**
CENT 0.55** 0.50**
LA -0.09 -0.19*
LU 0.007 0.009
NC (National Coalition), SDP (Social Democratic Party), CENT (Finnish Centre Party),
LA (Left Alliance), GREEN (Green League)
*(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level
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Table 4. Marginal eﬀects within gender groups.
1995-01 1995-01
Male Female
Polls Sp97 0.05 0.08
Au97 -0.04 0.1*
Au98 0.01 0.05
Sp99 -0.04 0.02
Au99 -0.02 0.1*
Sp00 0.08
Au00 -0.09*
Sp01 -0.04 -0.00
Au01 -0.06 0.14**
Govt2 0.27** 0.23**
Age 18-24 0.13* 0.22**
25-34 0.007 0.04
35-49 -0.03 -0.01
50-64 0.04 0.00
Education Notraining -0.21* -0.13
Vocational -0.02 -0.04
Polytechnic -0.02 -0.08*
Academic -0.03 -0.10**
Socio Farmer -0.18** -0.14**
Entrepreneur -0.006 -0.03
White-collar 0.003 0.03
Blue-collar -0.04 -0.003
Pensioner -0.02 0.03
Income Below-mid -0.03 -0.11**
Mid -0.04 -0.09**
Above-mid -0.02 -0.13**
*(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level
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Table 4 continues. Marginal eﬀects within gender groups.
1995-01 1995-01
Voted for SDP 0.37** 0.36**
NC 0.24** 0.26**
CENT -0.17** -0.15**
LEFT 0.01 0.06
Local LU -0.02** -0.01**
N 3201 2899
pseudo R2 0.17 0.16
log likelihood -1841.72 -1684.22
NC (National Coalition), SDP (Social Democratic Party), CENT (Finnish Centre Party),
LA (Left Alliance), GREEN (Green League)
*(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level
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